On 30 January 2026, the Administrative Court handed down judgment in R (CHO) v Lonsdale School, Hertfordshire County Council and Secretary of State for Education [2026] EWHC 166 (Admin).

In May 2025, the school decided to close at 1.30pm on Fridays for the Autumn Term of 2025 (“the Decision”). The Decision followed two earlier decisions to close at this time on Fridays for the Spring and Summer Terms of 2025. In August 2025, the claimant applied for permission to judicially review the decision. He argued that: (i) the Local Authority had only authorised reduced hours at schools serving exclusively disabled children (and not at mainstream schools), and therefore engaged in direct or indirect disability discrimination; (ii) the school and Local Authority breached the Secretary of State for Education’s non-statutory guidance on the length of the school week without good reason, and / or took into account the legally immaterial consideration of cutting costs; (iii) if the guidance did permit reductions in hours for the purpose of cutting costs in special schools but not in mainstream schools, then the guidance itself was discriminatory; and (iv) the school’s decision breached the requirement under the guidance and / or the Education (School Day and School Year) (England) Regulations 1999 to provide enough education of a sufficient quality.

The court dismissed the claim on all grounds. As a preliminary point, it found that the Decision was not academic in light of the school’s recent return to ordinary school hours; the claimant still had an interest in obtaining declaratory relief. On the substantive issues, the court first concluded that, under the Education Act 2002, the Decision was for the school to make, not the Local Authority, and that the decision was in fact made by the school with advice and guidance from the Local Authority. Secondly, the Decision was not made in order to cut costs but to deal with exceptional staffing challenges. It followed that the Decision did not amount to direct or indirect disability discrimination, nor was there any breach of the non-statutory guidance on the length of the school week. The non-statutory guidance itself was not discriminatory, nor was the school’s decision in breach of the Education (School Day and School Year) (England) Regulations 1999.

David Lawson acted for the First Defendant (instructed by Wendy Li and Cleopatra-Louise Coleman of Hertfordshire County Council Legal Services Department), while Anna Tkaczynska and Jake Rylatt acted for the Second Defendant (instructed by Saul Gavin of Hertfordshire County Council Legal Services Department). Please click here to read the full judgment of the court.

In Curwen v Chief Constable of Cumbria Constabulary [2026] EWHC 115 (KB), the High Court heard claims of false imprisonment and battery brought against the chief constable following an incident in which a claimant sustained serious injuries during police officers’ attempt to detain him.

Three police officers, two of whom were equipped with Tasers, had responded to reports of a male carrying a knife and behaving erratically. A struggle ensued as officers attempted to restrain the male, leading to multiple discharges of Taser and the use of PAVA spray.

The court held that a generalised impression of something having gone wrong and of things having got out of hand was not sufficient for the claim to succeed. Although it might have been possible for the officers to defuse matters had there been the opportunity for a considered assessment, each officer, acting individually, used no more force than they honestly and reasonably believed to be necessary in a fast-paced and escalating situation.

The claim was therefore dismissed.

Elliot practises in all areas of police law, including police pay, pensions, powers, policy and misconduct. He is a contributing author to the annual Blackstone’s Police Manual.

See the judgment here.

The Court of Appeal (Lady Carr CJ, Singh and Whipple LJJ) today handed down judgment in R (Di Maria) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2026] EWCA Civ 28.

At first instance, Kevin Baumber for PS Di Maria persuaded Lang J that the police’s system for reviewing officers’ vetting and withdrawing it, then dismissing them for lack of vetting was unlawful on several grounds.

The Commissioner, represented by John Beggs KC, James Berry KC and Katherine Hampshire appealed. By the time of the hearing, the Police (Vetting) Regulations 2025 had come into force, setting out a process for review and withdrawal of vetting which met most of Lang J’s concerns.

The appeal was therefore limited to whether Lang J was correct to find that a matter could not be taken into account in a vetting review (on the basis that there were reasonable grounds for suspecting that it was true) if the same matter had been found to have no case to answer, or had not been found proved, in misconduct proceedings (save in exceptional circumstances). This was an important question because many vetting reviews concern officers who have faced misconduct investigations or proceedings which have not resulted in their dismissal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. The Court accepted the Commissioner’s argument, supported by the College of Policing represented by Aaron Rathmell, that vetting involves a multifactorial assessment of risk which may include consideration of matters notwithstanding the fact that they have previously been considered in misconduct processes.

The judgment will have significant implications for vetting reviews and withdrawal assessments. For the judgment, please see here.

John, James, Kevin, Aaron and Katherine are experts in police (and non-police) vetting and judicial challenges to vetting decisions.

We’re delighted to announce the forthcoming appointment of Michael Walsh, Alexander dos Santos and Elliot Gold as King’s Counsel.

Michael specialises in Clinical Negligence, Inquests and Inquiries, and Human Rights Act claims; with particular expertise in high-value and complex civil claims, healthcare-related Article 2 and jury inquests arising from deaths in detention, and Judicial Review. Clients cited by the directories describe him as “a wonderful barrister who is an expert in his field and handles the most complex and sensitive cases with ease”.

Alexander practises in Regulatory and Financial Crime, Extradition, Public Law, Professional Discipline, and Commercial Law. He is noted by the directories as being “hard-working, user-friendly and very bright. A great team player who will do his utmost to support you and get results.”

Elliot is instructed regularly in cases spanning the full range of Police Law including Civil Actions, Misconduct, Inquests, Judicial Review and Discrimination. Recent directory editorial describes him as “an intellect that is beyond any level. He’s incredibly committed and fights for clients.”

Congratulations to Michael, Alexander and Elliot and many thanks to all those who participated in the application process as referees. These appointments will bring our silk team to 31 (from 9 a decade ago) including 9 women, consolidating the expertise we are able to offer to our clients.

Angus Moon KC has won an appeal to the Supreme Court in a judgment handed down on 21st January 2026. Angus was instructed for the first appellant in Lewis-Ranwell v G4S & ors. The case involved a clinical negligence claim by the killer of 3 elderly men who was later found not guilty by reason of insanity. The appellants argued that his claim in negligence was barred by the doctrine of illegality.

The Claimant, Mr Lewis-Ranwell, defeated the argument of illegality at first instance and in the Court of Appeal. Angus was brought in for the appeal to the Supreme Court, having not appeared below. The appeal to the Supreme Court has been successful.

The case has widespread ramifications for the NHS, police forces and other public authorities sued by killers.

For a copy of the judgment, please click here.

Kevin Baumber acts for officer acquitted of GBH following taser deployment

Metropolitan Police Service officer PC Newman was unanimously acquitted by a jury of an allegation of s.20 grievous bodily harm arising from the use of a taser during the arrest of a burglary suspect, following a foot chase in Woodford in the early hours of the morning.

The complainant fell from a height during the incident and suffered tetraplegia as a secondary injury. The trial involved detailed consideration of body-worn video footage, eyewitness accounts, and expert evidence on tasers and their use.

Kevin Baumber acted as defence counsel. For further information on Kevin’s practice, please see his website profile here.

For press coverage from the BBC, please click here.

We are delighted to announce that Emma Sutton KC has been appointed to the Welsh Government’s Panel of King’s Counsel.

The appointment was confirmed on 12 January 2026 by the Counsel General and Minister for Delivery, Julie James MS, following a highly competitive recruitment process. Emma will take up her appointment on 1 February 2026 for a five-year term.

The Panel provides specialist legal advocacy and advisory work for the Welsh Government, and this appointment recognises Emma’s outstanding expertise and standing in her field.

Further details are available in the Welsh Government’s press release here.

Emma Sutton KC has successfully acted as Advocate to the Court in the case of In the Matter of the Secretary of State for Defence [2026] EWCA Civ 3; one of three joined appeals brought by the Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary and Home Secretary (RA and AA v SSFCDA, MZZ v SSD and SSHD and In the Matter of the SSD [2026] EWCA Civ 3]. The Court of Appeal was asked to determine the scope of judicial powers exercisable by the Judge in Charge of the Administrative Court to make directions/orders:

(1) Which extended beyond the particular case before the court;
(2) Related to future or other related litigation not yet commenced;
(3) (in the case of In the Matter of the SSD) Where there was no existing judicial review claim.

The appeals arose from orders made in the context of two policies operated by the UK Government in connection with UK operations in Afghanistan: the Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (‘ARAP’) and the Afghanistan Response Route (‘ARR’). The latter policy was passed in response to a data breach in February 2022, in which an MoD dataset containing personal information and contact details of persons who had applied for relocation to the UK from Afghanistan under ARAP had been compromised. The policies were considered necessary to protect individuals and their families from the risk of ill-treatment or death at the hands of the Taliban.

The appellants sought permission to appeal which was granted by Elisabeth Laing LJ. She required an Advocate to the Court to be appointed, and it was highlighted by the Court of Appeal in its judgment that “the role has been expertly performed by Ms Emma Sutton KC”

Key pointers

(1)   Know the limits of Administrative Court powers: the judgment clarifies that the court does not have (i) a supervisory power over executive policy (there are constitutional boundaries between the court’s powers and executive policy choices), or (ii) an inherent case management power over future claims.

(2)   Closed Material Procedure: the judgment reinforces the role and importance of Special Advocates and SASO in CMP cases where non-disclosure risks the right to a fair hearing, whilst emphasising that there must be a party to whom a Special Advocate is appointed to represent.

Background

In September 2023, the MoD obtained a super-injunction preventing disclosure of both the data breach, and the existence of the injunction itself (MOD v Global Media and Entertainment Limited and Others [2025] EWHC 1806 (Admin)).

The super-injunction prevented applicants from being informed of the breach and the increased risk it might have created for them. Consequently, a series of ARAP-related cases arose in which a CLOSED procedure was used to enable applicants to be represented by Special Advocates. It remained in place until 4 July 2025.

As Lord Justice Peter Jackson emphasised in the decision handed down on Thursday (8 January 2026), when granted, it was anticipated that the super-injunction would be necessary for 4 months. That it remained in force for almost two years was, he said, “an extraordinary departure from the principle of open justice”, justified only by the acute need to protect individuals named in the breach, and their families, from the risk of ill-treatment or death at the hands of the Taliban. He went on to stress that the scope and duration of the super-injunction, which prevented all public scrutiny of these proceedings, meant that “the duty of candour owed by the public authorities towards the court and the other parties was of exceptional importance; moreover, that the court had to be especially vigilant to ensure that there were no further encroachments on the fair hearing rights of the other parties”. (at [5]).

In March 2024, the Secretary of State for Defence proposed a new route for the relocation of high profile individuals, however this was declared unlawful by the Divisional Court in R (CX1 and MP1) v Secretary of State for Defence [2024] EWHC (Admin) 892 (‘CX1’). The Secretary of State for Defence responded by developing the ARR policy in April 2024, and corresponded with the court to ensure it complied with the decision in CX1.

In July 2024 the revised approach regarding complex cases was approved. Some months later, while hearing two linked judicial review claims brought by HR, an unsuccessful ARAP applicant, Swift J became aware of the ARR policy and ordered the Secretary of State for Defence to provide a note explaining what steps had been taken to amend the policy statement following the decision in CX1. Not content with the response received, Swift J listed a closed hearing on 25 October 2024 under the title ‘In the matter of the Secretary of State for Defence, Listed by the Court of its own motion’.

During this hearing, the judge expressed considerable concern about what he considered was the extensive delay in amending the ARR policy in line with CX1. He made a mandatory order requiring the Ministers to update and operate its policy in line with the decision in CX1, and to require that any future policy changes be reported to the Special Advocates’ Support Office (‘SASO’) and the Judge in Charge.

–

The appeals

Eight grounds of appeal were submitted in ‘In the matter of the Secretary of State for Defence’. The thrust was that the judge had exceeded the jurisdiction of the Hight Court both in purporting to exercise functions that rest with the Executive, and in making an order that attempted to bind a person who was not before the Court, and where there was no existing litigation in which an order could be made. It was further submitted that it exceeded the High Court’s power to make an order requiring service of material on SASO, when there was no party whom a Special Advocate could represent, and therefore no role for SASO. It was also procedurally unfair to the Secretary of State in the manner in which it was heard.

The Court of Appeal considered that these appeals “engaged two fundamental legal principles. The first concerns the extent of judges’ powers and the second concerns the constitutional position of the judiciary in relation to the executive” (at [53]). On the first, while the court emphasised that “judges in our system, whatever their roles, decide the cases that are listed before them”, it recognised that “there are circumstances in which the impact of a decision in an individual case will extend beyond the parties themselves” (at [54]). The court explained the various mechanism by which the court, or individual judges, can bind the world at large (such as via reporting restrictions) or provide guidance (such as the issuing of formal Practice Guidance).

On the constitutional question, the Court of Appeal was unequivocal in stating that “under our system of separation of powers, judges do not make policy” (at [58]). The court may be called upon to identify whether a policy is lawful, but it does not and should not write the policy itself. On this basis, the quashing order made by the High Court in CX1 was lawful and legitimate, while the mandatory order made by Swift J in ‘In the matter of the Secretary of State for Defence’ was not. It had crossed “the constitutional boundary” (at [58]), as was submitted by Emma as Advocate to the Court.

In ‘In the matter of the Secretary of State for Defence’, the appeal succeeded on several grounds. The mandatory order was held to have “transgressed a fundamental boundary between the role of the court and the role of the executive”, while the “strictures” in relation to SASO were also accepted as well-founded. The unprecedented nature of the order meant that the process was “less than fair”.

The Court of Appeal was at pains to recognise the good intentions behind the orders, stating “As Judge in Charge of the Administrative Court, the judge was centrally concerned with this endeavour and we strongly endorse his commitment to upholding the overriding objective of dealing justly with these extremely sensitive cases.” Ultimately, however, it was held that all three orders, “though made with the best of motives”, were unlawful as Swift J had gone beyond the court’s powers.

Imogen Goold

12 January 2026

David Lawson successfully represented Hertfordshire County Council in the case of R & RK v Hertfordshire [2025] UKUT 381, an appeal about the complex and much disputed boundary between educational provision and healthcare provision. The issue has come before the courts and tribunals regularly since at least the 1990s. Education and health care provision fall under different statutory regimes, only one of which has an appeal mechanism.

The Upper Tribunal suggested that “the classification depends on how closely connected a provision is to the delivery of education” but noted that educational provision may also fulfil the function of treatment, meaning that a clear boundary is likely to be hard to find. The Upper Tribunal considered the order in which the various subsections of section 21 CFA 2014 should be applied, finding that the order in which they are considered might matter (at [42]-[43]) and suggesting practical ways to deal with the issue.

The decision can be found here.